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I. Introduction
On September 17, 2007, Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
("Chiquita") became the first major U.S. corporation to be charged
"with having financial dealings with terrorists."1  The world's
largest banana producer2 pled guilty to one felony count of
engaging in transactions with a Specially-Designated Global
Terrorist (SDGT) on March 19, 2007, in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia.3 Attempting to protect its employees,
property, and a lucrative foreign banana investment, Chiquita
admitted to paying a Colombian paramilitary group approximately
$1.7 million in "security" fees between 1997 and 2004 in violation
of U.S. counter-terrorism legislation.4 Pursuant to a plea bargain
with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the banana giant
agreed to pay a $25 million criminal fine, serve five years of
I Laurie P. Cohen, Chiquita Under the Gun, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2007, at Al.
2 Id.
3 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to
Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization and Agrees to Pay $25 Million
Fine (Mar. 19, 2007) http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd 161.html
[hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
4 Jordy Yager, Chiquita Fined for Colombia Payments, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2007, at A8; see also Factual Proffer at 8, U.S. v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., No. 07-055
(D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007) available at http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/corporate-
govemance/international-corporate-governance/us-v-chiquita-intl-brands [hereinafter
Factual Proffer] (follow "Factual Proffer" hyperlink).
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corporate probation, and implement an effective compliance and
ethics program to prevent future violations.' As part of the plea
agreement, Chiquita also agreed to fully cooperate with federal
authorities in their ongoing investigation.'
Although Chiquita is the only U.S. corporation to have been
prosecuted for such violations, the problems faced by the company
are familiar to other American corporations operating abroad.
Phoenix-based Freeport-McMoRan, one of the world's largest
gold producers, reportedly paid Indonesian military forces nearly
$20 million between 1998 and 2004 to ensure the safety of their
employees.7 Similarly, both Exxon and the Alabama-based coal-
mining company, Drummond Co., were allegedly forced to build
vocational schools, pave roads, support clinics, and subcontract
projects to guerrilla-owned enterprises between 1990 and 2002 in
order to peacefully co-exist with rebel groups and protect their
Latin American investments.8
Due to the existence and commonality of these problems,
Chiquita's conviction raises several important questions. Some
experts question whether Chiquita's harsh sentencing will deter
corporate self-reporting since "[companies] suffer no worse by
waiting to get caught." 9  Others question the extent to which
corporate executives may be held individually liable for approving
such payments.1" Still others wonder how Chiquita's conviction
will affect foreign direct investment, especially in countries
lacking political stability and security." Despite the validity of
5 DOJ Press Release, supra note 3.
6 See Letter from Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Counsel
for Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/corporat
e-governance/intemational-corporate-governance/us-v-chiquita-intl-brands [hereinafter
DOJ Plea Agreement] (follow "Plea Agreement" hyperlink).
7 See Jane Perlez & Raymond Bonner, Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of
Waste, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 2005, at Al.
8 Nazih Richani, Multinational Corporations, Rentier Capitalism, and the War
System in Colombia, 47 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 113, 125 (2005).
9 See Cohen, supra note 1, at Al.
10 See Juan Forero, Colombia May Seek Chiquita Extraditions, WASH. POST, Mar.
21, 2007, at DI (examining whether individual corporate executives will be extradited to
Colombia for approving illegal transactions).
11 Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Financing: Avoiding the
Externalities of a Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 109, 137
(2008).
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these questions, the most pressing issue involves balancing
economic prosperity and employee safety; specifically, how
American multinational corporations are to remain internationally
competitive despite tightening U.S. counter-terrorism legislation.
In Part II, this Note will examine the law prohibiting financial
dealings with Specially-Designated Global Terrorists. Part III will
discuss the right-wing paramilitary group at issue. Part IV will
explore the facts underlying U.S. v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 2
and Part V will address the effects of Chiquita's sentencing.
Finally, Part VI will conclude that the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act unfairly disadvantages American
corporations by forcing them to either risk the security of their
foreign investments and the safety of their employees or suffer the
substantial and unintended economic losses associated with
foreign withdrawal.
II. Background Law
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
was passed in 1977 as part of a congressional reform seeking to
"revise and delimit" presidential powers in times of national
emergency.13 The Act grants the President of the United States the
authority to deal with "any unusual and extraordinary threat,
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United
States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States, if the President declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat."' 4 Specifically, the IEEPA confers upon the
President the power to "investigate, regulate, or prohibit" a variety
12 Count One - Engaging in Transactions with a Specially-Designated Global
Terrorist, U.S. v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., No. 07-055 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2007),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB217/indictment.pdf
[hereinafter Count One]; see also Government's Sentencing Memorandum, U.S. v.
Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. No. 07-055 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/corporate-governance/international-corporate-
governance/us-v-chiquita-intl-brands [hereinafter Government's Sentencing
Memorandum] (follow "Government Sentencing Memorandum" hyperlink).
13 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(2000); see also S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 4541 (1977) (stating that the IEEP was primarily
enacted as a result of "extensive use by Presidents of emergency authority under section
5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to regulate both domestic and
international economic transactions unrelated to a declared state of emergency").
14 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2000).
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of foreign transactions during times of declared national
emergency. 5 Should the President exercise his authority under the
IEEPA, anyone convicted of willfully violating such established
regulations or prohibitions may be fined up to $50,000 and
imprisoned for a period of up to ten years. 6
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13224 (the
"Order") on September 23, 2001, pursuant to his authority under
the JEEPA.' 7  The Order, which sought to disrupt terrorist
financing, prohibited any United States person from engaging in
transactions with any foreign persons determined by the Secretary
of State, "to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of
committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S.
nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of
the United States."' 8  In essence, the Order broadened the
government's authority to freeze assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction
that are connected to either a designated terrorist organization or
an entity found to be associated with them.' 9 Once the Secretary
of State designates an individual or an entity as a terrorist threat,
the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) identifies the party as a "Specially-Designated Global
Terrorist" (SDGT) and publishes the designation in both the
Federal Register and on the OFAC website. 20 To implement the
sanctions imposed by the Order, the Secretary of the Treasury
promulgated the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations.2'
15 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2000).
16 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), but see 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)-(d) (2000). Although
§1705(b) of the IEEPA only provides for a maximum $50,000 criminal fine, it also
makes possible a prison term often years. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) classifies any criminal
statute which makes possible a prison term of ten to twenty-four years as a Class C
felony. The fine for a felony is, for an individual, no more than $250,000, twice the
offender's gain, or twice the victim's loss, and for an organization, no more than
$500,000, twice the offender's gain, or twice the victim's loss.
17 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
18 Id. § 1(b).
19 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. Treas., Contributions of the Department of the
Treasury to the Financial War on Terrorism - Fact Sheet (Sept. 10, 2002),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/200291018455629121 L.pdf [hereinafter
DOT Fact Sheet].
20 See 31 C.F.R. § 594.201 (2005).
21 Id.
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The Secretary of State may also designate a group as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act if it is determined that the group is a "foreign
organization" and "engages in terrorist activities, terrorism, or
retains the capability and intent" to engage in either.22 To make
this designation, the Secretary of State must also determine that
the terrorist activity threatens either the security of "United States
nationals or the national security of the United States. 2 3  If a
group is designated as a FTO, then it is unlawful for any person in
the United States, or subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to the
group.24 Those who violate this prohibition are subject to fine,
imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years, or both, and if death of
any person results, then "for any term of years or for life. 25
III. Las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
For nearly sixty years, paramilitary groups have been
operating in Colombia as a "loose connection of irregular
combatants., 26 Their violent existence, marked by kidnappings,
assassinations, and forced disappearances, began in the 1950s with
the aim of protecting agrarian enterprises from extreme left-wing
groups.27  Despite disapproving of their violent tactics, the
Colombian government passed a law in 1994 permitting the
groups to organize into armed "private security services., 28 The
government hoped that by legalizing their organization, the
paramilitary groups would deescalate the mounting violence
instigated by dangerous guerilla insurgents like the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejercito
de Liberacion Nacional (ELN).29  Having been tortured and
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (1) (a) (2000).
23 Id.
24 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).
25 Id.
26 See Luz E. Nagle, Colombian Asylum Seekers: What Practitioners Should Know
About the Colombian Crisis, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 441, 451-52 (2004).
27 Id.
28 Luz E. Nagle, Survey: Solving Problems Facing International Law Today:
Global Terrorism in Our Own Backyard: Colombia's Legal War Against Illegal Armed
Groups, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 18 (2005).
29 Id. at 17-19.
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harassed by left-wing guerillas for years, wealthy landowners
gladly employed local militias to protect their interests. 30 The law,
however, did not have the effect that the government had
anticipated, as the new vigilante groups, known as the "Convivir,"
were soon blamed for peasant murders, political assassinations,
and other human rights violations. 3 By 1997, Colombian officials
realized that they had made a mistake by legalizing paramilitary
32groups. In November of that year, the Office of the
Superintendent of Private Vigilante and Security Groups admitted
that it was "incapable of fulfilling its responsibility to oversee
these legal, state-supported paramilitary organizations. 33
Although the Office subsequently tried to put paramilitary groups
out of business, it was too late; local Convivir forces had already
established themselves and were "versed in the art of propaganda
and self-promotion. 34
In April 1997, Carlos Castafio, a well-known Colombian
paramilitary leader, organized the Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia (Unified Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC)
from these smaller, disjointed local militias.35  The group's
heterogeneous membership has been described as, "a marriage of
interests between powerful local warlords, drug barons, organised
crime, members of local political and economic elites and counter-
insurgent groups."36 Although considered an "umbrella group,"
comprised of independently-operating paramilitary groups, each
group shares a common commitment to protecting local economic
interests and combating leftist guerrillas.37
30 See Juan Forero, Ranchers in Colombia Bankroll Own Militia, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
8, 2001, at Al.
31 See Peter Santina, Army of Terror: The Legacy of U.S.-Backed Human Rights
Abuses in Colombia, 21 HARV. INT'L REv. 40, 41-42 (1998).
32 Nagle, supra note 28, at 19.
33 Santina, supra note 31, at 42.
34 Nagle, supra note 28, at 19.
35 Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Transitional Justice in Times of Conflict:
Colombia's Ley de Justiciay Paz, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 49, 56 (2006).
36 Int'l Crisis Group, Colombia's New Armed Groups: Latin America Report No.
20 (2007), http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/intemational-crisis-group-report.pdf.
37 See U.S. Sec'y. of State, Country Reports on Terrorism (2006),
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006 (follow "Chapter 6 - Terrorist Organizations"
hyperlink).
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Like the groups that formed its membership, the AUC was
initially employed by landowners and businessmen, but as the
organization grew in power, it began engaging in "illicit activities
to fund its operations. ' 38 In 2000, Castafio admitted that
approximately seventy percent of the AUC's income came from
illegal drug trafficking.39 Colombian officials also reported that
the AUC stole petrol from a punctured pipeline in 2002 and 2003,
which it subsequently sold on the black market for more than $180
million.4" The remainder of the group's multi-million dollar
budget is said to originate from acts of extortion and
"contributions" from local "supporters."'41  Well-financed, the
AUC grew from 4,000 lightly armed participants in 1997 to more
than 12,000 heavily-equipped soldiers in 2002.42 The AUC
quickly became such a well-recognized military force that the
Colombian army supplied them with both weapons and
intelligence, sending them ahead of official forces into rural areas
of suspected guerilla activity.43
Despite identifying itself as a "small defense" organization, the
AUC "is responsible for some of the worst human rights atrocities
38 Charles P. Trumbull, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 283, 336 (2007); see also U.S. Sec'y. of State, supra note 37 (reporting that the AUC
has "increasingly discarded its counter-guerilla activities, electing instead to involve
itself in the illegal drug trade").
39 Narco Terrorism. International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism - A Dangerous
Mix: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of
Deborah McCarthy, Deputy Assistant Sec'y. for Int'l. Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs), available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/21129.htm.
40 Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 36, at 4.
41 See Scott Wilson, Colombia's Other Army, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at Al;
see also Luz E. Nagle, Placing Blame where the Blame is Due: The Culpability of Illegal
Armed Groups and Narcotics Traffickers in Colombia's Environmental and Human
Rights Catastrophes, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 28-29 (2004).
42 Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 36, at 3-5; see also Kim Cragin & Bruce Hoffman,
Arms Trafficking and Colombia, NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST. 30 (2003),
http://rand.org/pubs/monographreports/MR1468/MR1468.pdf, (reporting that "the
AUC spends approximately $1,500 per person per year on war materials"); see generally
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOU'LL LEARN NOT TO CRY: CHILD COMBATANTS IN COLOMBIA
(2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/colombia0903.pdf (reporting
that an increasingly large percentage of the AUC's forces are comprised of women and
children under the age of fifteen).
43 Nagle, supra note 28, at 19.
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in Colombia."" Some sources even estimate that the AUC has
participated in seventy percent of all Colombian human rights
violations.45 These violations have been primarily attributed to the
AUC's indiscriminate combat tactics.46  In addition to directly
attacking the leftist guerrillas, the AUC targets civilian
populations which they view as sympathetic to the insurgency
movement.47  To spread terror among these populations and
discourage civilian support of left-wing groups, the AUC
"systematically engage[s] in death threats, summary executions,
massacres, torture, and . . . forced disappearance[s]. 48 Such
tactics have been largely responsible for the massive number of
internally displaced people in Colombia.49 To date, the AUC has
killed more civilians than the main guerrilla army it was originally
founded to combat, and is considered by some as Colombia's
"prime terrorist group."5 Because of its long and documented
history as a human rights violator, the extreme paramilitary group
has since been designated as a terrorist organization by both the
44 Trumbull, supra note 38, at 336; see generally U.N. High Comm'r. for Human
Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/2005/10, available at
http://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/Informe204-e
ng.pdf (describing U.N. findings on AUC paramilitary activity in Colombia).
45 Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? An Analysis of the Colombian
Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 23, 34 (2000).
46 See Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in
International Humanitarian Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1999); see also John C. Dugas, Colombia in POLITICS OF LATIN
AMERICA: THE POWER GAME 497, 512 (Harry E. Vanden & Gary Prevost, eds., 2006).
47 Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 46, at 17-18.
48 See id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Colombian
Terrorists Arrested in Cocaine-for-Weapons Deal, (2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/prl10602.html (reporting that, "according to the
Colombian National Police (CNP) the AUC conducted 804 assassinations, 203
kidnappings, and 75 massacres with 507 victims" in 2001).
49 Jose E. Arvelo, Note, International Law and Conflict Resolution in Colombia:
Balancing Peace and Justice in the Paramilitary Demobilization Process, 37 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 411, 425 (2006); see also U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, (2002),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8326.htm (reporting that in 2001 "violence
and instability in rural areas displaced between 275,000 and 347,000 civilians").
50 Wilson, supra note 41, at Al; Daniel Kovalik, War and Human Rights Abuses:
Colombia and Corporate Support for Anti-Union Suppression, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 393, 395 (2004).
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United States and the European Union.51
IV. Underlying Facts
Until June 2004, Chiquita conducted business in the Republic
of Colombia primarily through a wholly-owned subsidiary, C.I.
Bananos de Exporataci6n, S.A. ("Banadex").52 The subsidiary,
which operated in the Urabd and Santa Marta regions, quickly
became Chiquita's most profitable banana producer.53 In 1997,
Carlos Castafio, the leader of the AUC, threatened Banadex
officials with an "unspoken but clear message" that failure to
make "security" payments to the AUC would result in physical
harm to the company's personnel and property.54 To protect their
employees and economic investment, Chiquita senior executives
and high ranking officers reviewed and approved the payments.55
Initially, the payments were made to the AUC through the
Convivir, private security companies licensed by the government,
which also operate as fronts to collect money for the AUC's illegal
activities.56 Chiquita made these payments monthly based on a
formula tied to banana production.57 Although the payments were
recorded in the corporate books and records as "security
payments" or "security services," no actual services or equipment
51 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism; Designation of a Foreign
Terrorist Organization, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,054 (Sept. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Designation of
AUC as FTO] (designating the AUC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization); see also
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism; Designation of a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,420 (Sept. 10, 2003) (redesignating the AUC as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization after further administrative review); Blocked Persons, Specially
Designated Nationals, Terrorists, Global Terrorists, Foreign Terrorist Organization, and
Narcotics Traffickers, 71 Fed. Reg. 39,773 (July 13, 2006) (listing the AUC as a
Specially-Designated Global Terrorist); The Counsel of the European Union, Council
Common Position 2006/380/CFSP, 114 O.J. (L. 25, 29) 29 May 2006 (placing the AUC
in a group of terrorist organizations that include Hamas, Hizbul Mujahideen, and the
Irish Republican Army), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOMonth.do?year=2006
&month=5 (follow "L144" hyperlink, then follow "25" hyperlink).
52 Count One, supra note 12, at 1-2.
53 Id. at 2.
54 Id. at 5.
55 Edward lwata & Donna Leinwand, Chiquita Agrees to Fine for Paying
Terrorists: Settlement in Colombia Case Awaits Judge's OK, USA TODAY, Mar. 15,
2007, at B .
56 Factual Proffer, supra note 4, at 5.
57 Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5.
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were provided. 8
On October 31, 2001, the AUC was identified as a SDGT
pursuant to Executive Order 13224."9 Although it is unclear at
what point Chiquita became aware of the AUC's designation as a
SDGT, the company was aware of the paramilitary group's
designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.6" Despite this
knowledge, Chiquita continued making the payments.6"
As a result of stringent European banana quotas and mounting
corporate debt, Chiquita filed for Chapter 11 protection on
November 28, 2001.62 After undergoing a corporate restructuring
and emerging from bankruptcy, the company seated a new Board
of Directors and Audit Committee.63 Although the payment's
form changed under Chiquita's new management, the payments
continued.64 Between approximately September 10, 2001, and
February 4, 2004, Chiquita made fifty payments to the right-wing
paramilitary group, totaling more than $825,000.65 These
payments ranged from as little as $3,595 to as much as $56,292.66
During this time, Chiquita earned more than $49.4 million from its
Colombian banana investments.67
As payments to the AUC continued and profits from their
Colombian subsidiary poured in, so did warnings from Chiquita's
58 Count One, supra note 12, at 6.
59 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treas., Office of Foreign Assets Control, Terrorism:
What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions 81 (Feb. 21, 2008),
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf.
60 Factual Proffer, supra note 4, at 7-8 (detailing that the AUC's designation as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization on Sept. 10, 2001 was well publicized, appearing in The
Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Cincinnati Post, and via an intemet-
based, password protected, subscription news service which Chiquita paid to receive and
which was viewed by an employee of the company); see also Designation of AUC as
FTO, supra note 51.
61 Factual Proffer, supra note 4, at 7-8.
62 Associated Press, Chiquita Files for Chapter 11 Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2001, at C4.
63 Count One, supra note 12, at 6.
64 Factual Proffer, supra note 4, at 6 (explaining that payments made by Chiquita's
new management were no longer made indirectly to the Convivir, but instead directly to
the AUC via cash payments).
65 Id. at 8.
66 Count One, supra note 12, at 8-9.
67 DOJ Plea Agreement, supra note 6, at 2.
Vol. XXXIV
CHIQUITA GOES BANANAS
outside legal counsel. When questioned as to the legitimacy of the
payments, Chiquita's lawyers repeatedly advised the company to
stop making the payments because they were illegal.68
Notwithstanding such warnings, the company continued to make
the payments.69
Chiquita quickly tired of shouldering what they deemed an
"excruciating moral dilemma."7 °  Fearful that local Cincinnati
reporters would uncover their illicit activities, Chiquita's Board of
Directors decided to disclose their actions to the DOJ.7 1 By the
time Chiquita senior executives met with DOJ officials on April
24, 2003, the company had made over ninety payments to the
AUC totaling nearly $1.4 million.72 Although DOJ officials
acknowledged that the issue of continued payments was
"complicated," they made it clear that the payments were illegal
and could not continue.73 Despite the persistent advice of its
outside counsel, the DOJ's statements, and the Board's
involvement in the matter, "Chiquita continued to pay the AUC
throughout 2003 and early 2004."'7 These subsequent payments
68 Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 12, at 9 (stating that on
February 21, 2003, outside counsel advised Chiquita that they, "Must stop payments"; on
February 26, 2003, counsel advised the company that, "Bottom Line: CANNOT MAKE
THE PAYMENT"; again on March 11, 2003, counsel advised, "[T]he company should
not continue to make Santa Marta payments, given the AUC's designation as a foreign
terrorist organization.").
69 Id. at 10.
70 Sue Reisinger, Blood Money Paid by Chiquita Shows Company's Hard Choices,
IN HOUSE COUNSEL, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=
1195639472310.
71 Factual Proffer, supra note 4, at 12.
72 Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2-6 (noting that
although Chiquita was only charged for making payments to the AUC between 2001 and
2004, Chiquita began paying the AUC as early as 1997).
73 Count One, supra note 12, at 13.
74 DOJ Press Release, supra note 3 (reporting that after discussing the situation
with the DOJ, outside counsel advised Chiquita in writing that: "[Department of Justice]
officials have been unwilling to give assurances or guarantees of non-prosecution; in
fact, officials have repeatedly stated that they view the circumstances presented as a
technical violation and cannot endorse current or future payments"); Government's
Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 12, at 10-11 (cautioning that claims of duress
would not insulate Chiquita from criminal liability because Banadex had a legal option
to withdraw from Colombia); Count One, supra note 12, at 15 (explaining that after
Chiquita officials fully disclosed the extent of the payment to the full Board of Directors,
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totaled more than $300,000. 75
On January 12, 2004, Chiquita named Fernando Aguirre as its
new President and Chief Executive Officer.7 6 Within one month
of assuming his new position, the former Proctor & Gamble
executive decided that the illegal payments had to stop." Chiquita
issued its last payment to the AUC on January 29, 2004.78 When
addressing senior officers regarding Chiquita's future in
Colombia, Aguirre stated that, "[a]t the end of the day, if extortion
is the modus operandi in Colombia or any other country, we will
withdraw from doing business in such a country."79
Although Chiquita ultimately settled with the DOJ for $25
million, the company could have been fined as much as $98.8
million pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571.8o Under the statute, an
offender may be fined up to twice his pecuniary gain for crimes
that carry a ten year prison sentence, as IEEPA violations do.8 ' By
Chiquita's estimates, the company made $49.4 million in profits
from its Colombian banana-producing operations between
September 10, 2001 and January 2004.82 Neither Chiquita nor the
DOJ have produced an explanation as to why Chiquita escaped the
maximum criminal penalty, but the Government's Sentencing
Memorandum suggests that the DOJ was influenced by the
company's motivations to "protect its Colombian employees" and
81their disinterest in actually furthering terrorist activities.
Chiquita's plea agreement with the DOJ has not marked the
end of the company's Colombia-related legal problems. On
November 14, 2007, the families of Colombian citizens killed by
a member of the Board stated, "I reiterate my strong opinion - stronger now - to sell our
operations in Colombia.").
75 DOJ Press Release, supra note 3.
76 Chiquita Brands International Names Fernando Aguirre President and Chief
Financial Officer, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 12, 2004, http://www.pmewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/
releaseid=l 15048.
77 Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 12, at 12.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 DOJ Plea Agreement, supra note 6, at 2; see 18 U.S.C. §3571(b)-(d) (2000).
81 See 50. U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2000) (stating that any natural person who violates the
IEEPA may be imprisoned for up to ten years).
82 See 18 U.S.C. §3571(b)-(d) (2000); DOJ Plea Agreement, supra note 6, at 2.
83 Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 12, at 13-16.
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the AUC at a time in which the organization received payments
from Chiquita filed suit against the company in a Federal District
Court in Manhattan.84 The families seek $7.86 billion in damages,
alleging that Chiquita abetted terrorism and crimes against
humanity."
V. Effects of Conviction
Despite their reputation as an assorted band of lawless rebels,
the AUC is a de facto government. In 2002, the group controlled
municipalities in twenty-seven of Colombia's thirty-two
departments.86 To ensure their control over these regions, the
AUC has cooperated extensively with the Colombian military,87
attained several high-ranking political positions,88 and utilized
millions of dollars worth of public resources.89  Since the
Colombian government has all but abandoned these rural areas
due to guerilla and paramilitary activity, the AUC essentially
governs the banana-producing regions of Urabd, Choc6, and Santa
Marta.9" As a result, when the United States prohibited U.S.
companies via the IEEPA from dealing with the AUC, the United
States, for all intents and purposes, levied a unilateral economic
sanction against all of Colombia.
84 See Associated Press, Victims of Colombian Conflict Sue Chiquita Brands, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/business/world
Business/i 5chiquita.html.
85 Id.
86 INT'L CRISIS GROUP, COLOMBIA: NEGOTIATING WITH THE PARAMILITARIES, LATIN
AMERICAN REPORT NO. 5 (2003), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?1=1&id=2
302; see also Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 36, at 4 (reporting that by 2007, the AUC
controlled between 4 and 6 million hectares of arable Colombian land).
87 See ANGEL RABASA & PETER CHALK, COLOMBIAN LABYRINTH: THE SYNERGY OF
DRUGS AND INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY 57 (2001); see
also Paul Richter & Greg Miller, Colombia Army Chief Linked to Outlaw Militias, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at Al.
88 See Juan Forero, Paramilitary Scandal Takes Colombian Elite by Surprise,
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2007, at A10.
89 See Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 36, at 4 (explaining that the AUC plundered
both municipal budgets and the Colombian health care system for more than $100
million).
90 Daniel Suman, Globalization and the Pan-American Highway: Concerns for the
Panama-Colombia Border Region of Darein-Choco and its Peoples, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 549, 567-70 (2006).
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Unfortunately, even the most optimistic studies suggest that
such unilateral sanctions are ineffective, whether used to achieve
political objectives or deter certain behaviors.9 According to
several sources, these sanctions have been responsible for the
creation of pervasive nationalism,92 the harming of innocent
civilian populations,93  and are detrimental to American
competitiveness.94  The negative consequences which befall
American multinational corporations upon the imposition of such
sanctions are primarily the result of a phenomenon known as
"business capture." 95 As U.S. businesses withdraw from foreign
countries pursuant to sanctioned mandates, they create a void in
the market which is subsequently filled by foreign competitors.96
Because "substitutes and alternative sources of supply are often
91 See GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY
AND CURRENT POLICY 158-60 (3d ed. 2007) (studying U.S. unilateral sanctions between
1914 and 1990 and concluding that they achieved their intended political purpose only
one third of the time); but see Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,
22 INT'L SECURITY 90, 92-95 (1997) (accusing Hufbauer's study of being overly
optimistic and flawed).
92 Pape, supra note 91, at 93; see ZACHARY A. SELDEN, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1999) (explaining a phenomenon known
as "rally around the flag" in which economic sanctions provide a common external
enemy which unites the population of the target country and increases the popularity of
the current leadership); see also Peter Margulies, Laws of Unintended Consequences:
Terrorist Financing Restrictions and Transitions to Democracy, 20 N.Y. INT'L L. REv.
65, 83 (2007) (stating that economic sanctions create a general resentment of
globalization which may dangerously unite otherwise disorganized groups).
93 See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the
Enjoyment of Human Rights, Working Paper for the Commissioner on Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (June 21, 2000) (prepared by Marc Bossuyt) ("[I]t is
usually the people who suffer, not the political elites whose behavior triggered the
sanctions in the first place"); see also Pape, supra note 91, at 110 (reporting that as many
as 567,000 Iraqi children may have died since the end of the Persian Gulf War because
of economic sanctions).
94 Harry Wolff, Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool or
Ineffective Hindrance on American Businesses?, 6 HOUS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 329, 331
(2006).
95 Gary C. Hufbauer et al., U.S. Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs,
and Wages (Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper, 1997), http://petersoninstitute.org/publi
cations/wp/wp.cfm?ResearchlD= 149.
96 Wolff, supra note 94, at 331; see e.g. Hufbauer, supra note 91 (utilizing a
positive residuals statistical analysis to demonstrate that U.S. unilateral sanctions on both
Cuba and China have been filled by European competitors).
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readily available on the world market," the United States rarely
possesses the requisite control over the supply of a particular good
to single-handedly impose a significant embargo.97
If the United States is going to use the IEEPA to impose
unilateral economic sanctions on de facto governments like the
AUC, then America's economy will suffer the same negative
consequences it has previously suffered under other unilateral
sanctions. For example, in 1995 American export revenues were
between $15 and $19 billion lower than they would have been in
the absence of U.S. unilateral sanctions.98 That same year, experts
estimate that such sanctions resulted in the loss of 200,000 export-
related jobs and a decrease of nearly $1 billion in American wage
revenue.
99
The non-quantifiable consequences of unilateral economic
sanctions may be even more significant. After conducting a
survey of more than 100 multinational corporations in 1998, the
U.S. International Trade Commission found that such sanctions
have a "chilling effect" on long-term commercial relationships, as
some foreign partners grow increasingly reluctant to do business
with U.S. companies out of concern about future U.S. sanctions.0 °
In a similar study conducted by the Institute for International
Economics, respondents expressed their hesitation to invest in
foreign markets which had not yet been the target of U.S.
sanctions, stating that "the risk of future sanctions to be high
enough that the contingent liabilities were unacceptable."' '
Simply put, "nearly all unilateral sanctions fail nearly all of the
tim e.,
102
Although the U.S. government claims that Executive Order
97 SELDEN, supra note 92, at 4.
98 Jeffrey J. Schott, U.S. Economic Sanctions: Good Intentions, Bad Execution,
Statement Before the Comm. on Int'l Rel. of the U.S. H. of Rep. (June 3, 1998),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchlD=314.
99 Id.
100 Robert A. Rogowsky, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the U.S. H.
Comm. on Ways and Means (May 27, 1999), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Legacy/trade/I06cong/5-27-99/5-27rogo.htm.
101 DAVID J. RICHARDSON, SIZING UP U.S. EXPORT DISINCENTIVES 57 (1993).
102 Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions
to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 437, 459 (2006).
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13224 has successfully disrupted terrorist financing,1 13 it has
conducted no parallel study examining the effects that the Order
has had on the American economy. The U.S. Department of the
Treasury asserts that one year after President Bush issued the
Order, the U.S., working through the United Nations and other
multilateral institutions, had frozen more than $34 million in
terrorist assets located in the U.S.1°4 This statistic is impressive,
but when compared to the long-term negative consequences that
the U.S. economy will suffer as a result of imposing unilateral
economic sanctions on de facto governments, these numbers seem
less significant. Chiquita alone was penalized $25 million,"°5 and
the banana company only represents a small fraction of U.S.
corporations operating in unstable foreign environments. Entity-
specific sanctions do not allow companies to remain competitive
by simply avoiding pre-identified terrorist groups. On the
contrary, as Chiquita's conviction demonstrates, they force U.S.
multinationals to either risk the security of their investments and
the safety of their employees or refrain from operating in these
countries altogether.0 6 Even those most vehemently opposed to
Chiquita's actions admit that U.S. corporations "could not operate
in these areas without paying the AUC."'' 7
VI. Conclusion
This Note addresses the facts and circumstances which
resulted in Chiquita Brands International, Inc. becoming the first
major U.S. corporation to be convicted of financial dealings with a
SDGT. Executive Order 13224, which prohibits any American
person from participating in such transactions, derives its authority
103 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. Treas., Contributions of the Department of the
Treasury to the Financial War on Terrorism - Fact Sheet 15 (Sept. 10, 2002),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/2002910184556291211 .pdf.
104 Id. at 8; see also Press Release, U.S. Dept. Treas., Progress in the War on
Terrorist Financing (Sept. 11, 2003), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/js721 .p
df.
105 DOJ Press Release, supra note 3.
106 See Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 12, at 16-17 (admitting
that under the circumstances, Chiquita could have done little besides withdraw from
Colombia and abandon its most-lucrative banana operation).
107 David J. Lynch, Murder and Payoffs Taint Business in Colombia, USA TODAY,
Oct. 30, 2007, at B1.
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from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.1"8
Although the Act has historically been used to impose unilateral
economic sanctions on foreign countries, the Act is increasingly
being used to disrupt terrorist financing.'0 9 Since a number of
designated terrorist organizations operate as de facto governments,
providing security services, regulating trade, and dominating local
politics, prohibiting American corporations from dealing with
them is equivalent to levying a unilateral economic sanction
against the countries in which they operate. Not only have studies
demonstrated that such sanctions are ineffective in achieving their
desired political goals, but they have also been shown to harm
American competitiveness."'0
Chiquita's recent conviction undoubtedly demonstrates that
"funding a terrorist organization can never be treated as a cost of
doing business."'' Unfortunately, it does not answer the question
of how American corporations are to remain competitive despite
tightening U.S. counter-terrorism legislation. Although the DOJ
suggests that corporations like Chiquita may withdraw from
countries in which their interests are put at risk by terrorist
groups,112  scholars predict that if all similarly-situated
multinational corporations were to abandon their foreign
operations "the price would be the collapse of the U.S. economy
and the end of the U.S. as a superpower." '113 Since foreign
withdrawal is not a realistic economic option, and since U.S.
counter-terrorism legislation prevents American companies from
meeting the demands of de facto governments, the IEEPA unfairly
disadvantages U.S. multinational corporations by forcing them to
risk the security of their foreign investment and the safety of their
employees.
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108 See Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the
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